Presidential Address
Pervasive Semiosis
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8903179 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Lúcia Santaella (0000-0002-0681-6073, corresponding author), Santaella Santaella |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 45 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 261-261 |
| Publication date | 2009-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Transactions of the Charles S Peirce Society (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0009-1774 • E-ISSN: 1558-9587 |
| Publisher | Indiana University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.2979/tra.2009.45.3.261 |
| OpenAlex | W2015617067 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 1 |
Peirce's statement that "all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs" has puzzled semioticians as much as his dictum of matter being "effete mind" has bewildered physicists and metaphysicians. Based on Peirce's broad concept of mind and on the presupposition that no pure, absolute secondness or brute reality can be found, neither in nature nor in thought, this paper discusses a possible way to overcome the semioticians' puzzlement and the metaphysicians' bewilderment. In the metaphysical context of synechism, mind is synonymous with continuity; in the logical context of semiotics it is synonymous with semiosis. Mind is continuity and semiosis. In the light of synechism, human mind and physical matter are the two extremes of a very subtle and complex range of differentiations along the continuous time-arrow that constitutes nature. If mind, the one kind of stuff in the universe, is conceived of as semiosis, then semiotics supplies us with concepts to guide the conjunction between semiosis and the synechistic postulate of continuity between mind and matter
Context (archaeology · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Presupposition · Semiosis · Semiotics · Advanced Text Analysis Techniques · Digital Humanities and Scholarship · History · Philosophy · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education
| Citations per year | 0.33 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2014 - 2023 (10) |
| Highly cited | No |