Power, Action, Signs
Between Peirce and Foucault
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8903235 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Andrew Wells Garnar (corresponding author), Andrew Garnar |
| Year | 2006 |
| Volume | 42 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 347-366 |
| Publication date | 2006-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Transactions of the Charles S Peirce Society (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0009-1774 • E-ISSN: 1558-9587 |
| Publisher | Indiana University Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.2979/tra.2006.42.3.347 |
| OpenAlex | W2026825791 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 6 |
This paper argues that pragmatists must be more cognizant of the concept of and its consequences. To demonstrate this, I show how Foucault's analytics of power can be brought into Peirce's theory of signs. Central to both philosophers is the role of action. Using the concept of action, I explain that Foucault's conception of power, action on actions, can be understood as structuring Peircian habits, which are rules for action. From here I build out to Peirce's semiotics, illustrating how power channels the meanings of signs in certain directions. The rest of the paper is dedicated to reconstructing in light of Foucault Peirce's claim that the is nothing more than the signs it uses. I argue that any understanding of the must account for the being distributed through a field of power. The paper concludes by proposing a new philosophy of the subject which seeks to reconcile Foucault's concerns with those of pragmatism
Action (physics · Epistemology · Field (mathematics · Michel foucault · Nothing · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Pragmatism · Semiotics · Sociology · Subject (documents · Computer Science · Foucault, Power, and Ethics · Law · Linguistics and Discourse Analysis · Philosophy · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education
| Unique citing works | 4 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,25 |
| Citation span | 2010 - 2023 (14) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 4 |