Pragmatism, Democracy, and the Plural Self

Bibliographic Data

ID8903281
AuthorsWesley Dempster (corresponding author), Wesley Dempster Wesley Dempster
Year2016
Volume52
Issue4
Pages633-633
Publication date2016-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueTransactions of the Charles S Peirce Society (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0009-1774 • E-ISSN: 1558-9587
PublisherIndiana University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.52.4.06
OpenAlexW2603039647
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited12

This article offers a pragmatist conception of multiplicitous subjectivity that captures the best features of Richard Rorty’s private ironist and John Dewey’s social self while rejecting anti-democratic implications I identify in each. On the one hand, Rorty rightly sees that having a plural self is crucial for self-creation but fails to see the connection between self-creation and social justice. On the other hand, Dewey rightly sees the interrelationship between personal and social growth but fails to appreciate the danger implicit in his emphasis on integration of differences (both within the self and in the community). To see how we can achieve a compelling synthesis of these two views, I turn to Gloria Anzaldúa’s theory of “mestiza consciousness,” which points us toward a model of democratic citizenship that brings together Rorty’s tolerance for multiplicity and ambivalence with Dewey’s relational understanding of personal development and social progress

Ambivalence · Citizenship · Democracy · Epistemology · Plural · Political science · Politics · Pragmatism · Self · Sociology · Subjectivity · Critical Theory and Philosophy · Law · Philosophy · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education · Psychology · Social Psychology · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications

Tools

Open DOISci-Hub