Functionalism, multiple principals and the reform of the Nato secretariat after the Cold War
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8911293 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Hylke Dijkstra (0000-0003-3637-5296, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 50 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 128-145 |
| Publication date | 2014-05-20 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Cooperation and Conflict (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0010-8367 • E-ISSN: 1460-3691 |
| Publisher | SAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1177/0010836714532919 |
| OpenAlex | W2046669622 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 9 |
| References cited | 43 |
The literature on international organizations tells us that diverging member states’ preferences and concerns about the loss of control are major obstacles to institutional reform. But what if changes in the international environment necessitate institutional reform? This article examines such dilemma in the case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO has faced functional pressures to adjust its machinery to the post-Cold War era, but has at the same time seen its membership and the preference heterogeneity of the membership increase. The article finds that institutional change is indeed difficult with multiple principals and uncertainty about the consequences of reform. Yet modest reform has still taken place. Firstly, strong functional pressures can help the member states to overcome their differences concerning institutional reform. Secondly, lower-level incremental reforms, beyond the control of the member states, have made NATO a more efficient organization. The empirical focus is on the development of the understudied International Staff post-1989
Cold war · Dilemma · Economics · European union · Functionalism (philosophy of mind · Institutional change · International trade · Member states · North Atlantic Treaty · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Treaty · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · International Development and Aid · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law · Public Administration
Who matters for memory
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Nato’s cyber defence
Accountability and Affective Styles in Administrative Reporting
Regaining control of errant agents? Agency slack at the European Commission and the World Health Organization
Why International Organizations Don’t Learn
Guardian of the international order”? Nato’s contested identity, the discourses of Secretaries General, and the Ukraine crisis
The EU's Decision Traps
Delegation and Agency in International Organizations
Managers of Global Change
Institutional Choice and Global Commerce
Inside Bureaucracy
Leadership and Negotiation in the European Union
Controlling Institutions
Veto Players
Politics in Time
After Hegemony
Risk, Threat, And Security Institutions
Introduction
Trading control
Efficiency versus Sovereignty
Nato's combined joint task forces in theory and practice
The International Civil Service
The Joint‐decision Trap
Governing at the frontier of the European commission
The Compound Machinery of Government
Nato Transformed
Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions
Delegation to Supranational Institutions
Why States Act through Formal International Organizations
Delegation to International Organizations
The Rational Design of International Institutions
The Limits of Design
Understanding Nato’s Sustainability
Bureaucratic Structure and Personality
| Citations per year | 0.69 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2013 - 2024 (12) |
| Highly cited | No |