Annapolis and the Abbas-Olmert direct negotiations

A critical analysis

Bibliographic Data

ID8911586
AuthorsRaphael Cohen-Almagor (0000-0002-5869-9243, corresponding author)
Year2026
Publication date2026-01-26
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueCooperation and Conflict (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0010-8367 • E-ISSN: 1460-3691
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/00108367251397783
OpenAlexW7125704855
LanguageEN
References cited17

This article explains the events that brought about the meaningful negotiations between President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert. Despite Olmert’s good intentions and clear willingness to make peace by agreeing to unprecedented concessions, Olmert failed to convince Abbas to sign an agreement. The article opens by explaining the research methodology and the theoretical framework. It then explains the Annapolis conference and process including the three tiers of negotiations installed by Israel and the Palestinian Authority. While Olmert presented the best peace offer to date that any Israeli prime minister was willing to sign, it remained short of the Palestinian demands. A host of reasons led to yet another failure to resolve the Israeli–Palestinian conflict are analyzed: the negotiations’ structure, internal rivalries in Israel and the Palestinians, the continuation of the settlement project, Olmert’s decision to embark on two wars, Olmert’s illegitimate leadership due to his implication in corruption affairs, and Palestinian lack of trust in the Israeli government to deliver a long-lasting peace. The article concludes with a detailed assessment of the negotiation dynamics, aiming to distill key lessons that may inform future efforts should Israeli and Palestinian leaders re-enter serious peace talks

Government (linguistics · Language change · Negotiation · Prime minister · Settlement (finance · Sign (mathematics · Agricultural and Environmental Management · Belt and Road Initiative · Jewish and Middle Eastern Studies

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