Arms Control Regimes and the Dissolution of the Soviet Union

Realism, Institutionalism and Regime Robustness

Bibliographic Data

ID8911903
AuthorsFrank Schimmelfennig (0000-0002-1638-1819, corresponding author)
Year1994
Volume29
Issue2
Pages115-148
Publication date1994-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueCooperation and Conflict (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0010-8367 • E-ISSN: 1460-3691
PublisherSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/0010836794029002002
OpenAlexW1971806339
LanguageEN
Citations received9
References cited26

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of 15 new states on its territory have raised the issue of the remaining in force of East-West security agreements. This article analyses the evolution of four major arms control and reduction regimes since the end of 1991. It seeks to determine how robust these regimes have proved under the impact of the Soviet collapse and whether the developments have tended to confirm Realist or Institutionalist assumptions about the stability of international institutions. The investigation shows that regimes regulating conventional arms control have proved fairly strong, whereas those regulating nuclear arms control have turned out to be weak. It is argued that no single factor claimed by Realism or Institutionalism can account for this outcome. There is ample evidence for the independent authority of international norms. However, the factors `power' and `relative gains orientation' emphasized by Realism are necessary to explain the translation of normative authority into regime robustness and the differences in robustness among the investigated cases

Arms control · Institutionalism · International relations · Normative · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Realism · Robustness (evolution · Sociology · Soviet union · Economic Sanctions and International Relations · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · International Relations and Foreign Policy · Law

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