Tactical Evolution in the French Army, 1560-1660

Bibliographic Data

ID8940650
AuthorsJohn A Lynn (corresponding author)
Year1985
Volume14
Issue2
Pages176-176
Publication date1985-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueFrench Historical Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0016-1071 • E-ISSN: 1527-5493
PublisherJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/286581
OpenAlexW2330663230
LanguageEN
Citations received6

Trying to understand seventeenth-century European history without weighing the influence of war and military institutions is like trying to dance without listening to the music. Territorial unification, bureaucratic growth, social tension, and civil rebellion were all influenced by the style and growth of armies on the Continent. No single publication has done more to extend our knowledge of seventeenth-century military history than Michael Roberts, The Military Revolution, 1560-1660.1 This very brief but provocative essay published in 1956 has set the terms of the debate and stimulated research and writing for nearly three decades. Roberts asserted that a revolution in tactics accomplished by the Dutch statthalter Prince Maurice of Nassau (1584-1625) and the Swedish king Gustavus Adolphus (1611-32) drove the older Spanish system of massive, unwieldy infantry formations off the battlefields of Europe. New strategy took advantage of well-trained mobile armies to pursue victory, instead of prolonging stalemate. At the same time, standing armies emerged as land forces grew to unprecedented proportions, giving statesmen potent weapons of war for grand schemes. However, the gargantuan armies spawned in the seventeenth century burdened society with crushing taxation, heavy-handed bureaucracies, and all the weighty trappings of absolutism. Since the initial appearance of Roberts's essay, a number of

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