Felony Forfeiture and the Profits of Crime in Early Modern England
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8956942 |
|---|---|
| Authors | K J Kesselring (0000-0003-1481-5828, Dalhousie University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 53 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 271-288 |
| Publication date | 2010-04-27 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Historical Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0018-246X • E-ISSN: 1469-5103 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0018246x10000014 |
| OpenAlex | W2066765500 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 9 |
For much of English history, the law punished felons not just with death, but also with the loss of their possessions. This article examines the practice of felony forfeiture in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, focusing on who profited and with what effects. It argues that recognizing the role such profit-takers played challenges common depictions of the nature and meaning of participation in law and governance. The heightened use of judicial revenues as tokens of patronage under Elizabeth and the early Stuarts impinged upon participatory aspects of the law's operation
Citizen journalism · Corporate governance · Criminology · Economics · Law and economics · Management · Neoclassical economics · Political science · Profit (economics · Revenue · Sociology · Accounting · Colonialism, slavery, and trade · Historical Economic and Legal Thought · Historical Economic and Social Studies · History · Law
Felony Forfeiture in England, c. 1170–1870
Subordination, Solidarity and the Limits of Popular Agency in a Yorkshire Valley c.1596-1615
Mercy and Liberality
The Revenue Commission of 1552
Imagining Insurrection in Seventeenth-Century England
The Rise of a Fiscal State in England, 1485-1815
Sir Henry Spiller, Recusancy and the Efficiency of the Jacobean Exchequer
Revenue Farming under the Early Stuarts
| Citations per year | 0.2 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2011 - 2023 (13) |
| Highly cited | No |