Institutions as dispositions

Searle, Smith and the metaphysics of blind chess

Dados Bibliográficos

ID8975111
AutoresMichaël Bauwens (0000-0002-2647-3012, Institute of Philosophy KU Leuven – University of Leuven Belgium, autor correspondente)
Ano2018
Volume48
Fascículo3
Páginas254-272
Data de publicação2018-02-06
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal for the Theory of Social Behaviour (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0021-8308 • E-ISSN: 1468-5914
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/jtsb.12161
OpenAlexW2789278889
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas2
Referências citadas29

This paper addresses the question what the fundamental nature and mode of being of institutional reality is. Besides the recent debate with Tony Lawson, Barry Smith is also one of the relatively few authors to have explicitly challenged John Searle's social ontology on this metaphysical question, with Smith's realism requirement for institutions conflicting with Searle's requirement of a one‐world naturalism. This paper proposes that an account of institutions as powers or dispositions is not only congenial to Searle's general account, but can also satisfy both the realism and the one world requirements. Searle's worry that such a dispositional account is unable to account for the deontic nature of institutions is countered by an appeal to higher‐order powers as well as Searle's notion of the gap and desire‐independent reasons for action

Action (physics · Appeal · Deontic logic · Economics · Epistemology · Metaphysics · Naturalism · Order (exchange · Political science · Realism · Sociology · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science