Mind Reading, Deception and the Evolution of Kantian Moral Agents

Bibliographic Data

ID8975169
AuthorsAlejandro Rosas (0000-0003-2941-0559, corresponding author)
Year2004
Volume34
Issue2
Pages127-139
Publication date2004-05-20
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal for the Theory of Social Behaviour (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0021-8308 • E-ISSN: 1468-5914
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.0021-8308.2004.00239.x
OpenAlexW2008962494
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited18

Classical evolutionary explanations of social behavior classify behaviors from their effects, not from their underlying mechanisms. Here lies a potential objection against the view that morality can be explained by such models, e.g. Trivers’ reciprocal altruism . However, evolutionary theory reveals a growing interest in the evolution of psychological mechanisms and factors them in as selective forces. This opens up perspectives for evolutionary approaches to problems that have traditionally worried moral philosophers. Once the ability to mind‐read is factored‐in among the relevant variables in the evolution of moral abilities and counted among the selection pressures that have plausibly shaped our nature as moral agents, an evolutionary approach can contribute, so I will argue, to the solution of a long‐standing debate in moral philosophy and psychology concerning the basic motivation for moral behavior

Altruism (biology · Deception · Epistemology · Evolutionary psychology · Game theory · Moral psychology · Morality · Reciprocal · Reciprocal altruism · Strong reciprocity · Cultural Differences and Values · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology

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