A social ontology of “maximal” persons
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8975809 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Oritsegbubemi Anthony Oyowe (0000-0002-4471-7682, Department of Philosophy University of the Western Cape Cape Town South Africa, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 52 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 147-163 |
| Publication date | 2021-07-06 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0021-8308 • E-ISSN: 1468-5914 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/jtsb.12312 |
| OpenAlex | W3181851960 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 32 |
In this paper, I address a range of arguments put forward by Kwame Gyekye (1992) and Bernard Matolino (2014) denying Menkiti’s twin propositions that persons differ ontologically from human beings and that human attitudes, behaviours and practices constitute persons in social reality. They argue that his account of “maximal” persons, rooted in African traditional thought‐worlds, conflates issues and ultimately involve him in a category mistake. I argue that their arguments do not succeed, and that Menkiti’s view is not in any predicament because of them. Then, I draw on John Searle’s account of social ontology to clarify the sense in which attitudes, behaviours and practices are constituents of persons. Thus, I characterise persons as social entities belonging in a social ontology. Finally, I argue that realism regarding persons is not undermined by the threat of conventionalism lurking behind the view
Critical realism (philosophy of perception · Epistemology · Mistake · Naturalism · Ontology · Political science · Realism · Social ontology · Social science · Social worlds · Sociology · African cultural and philosophical studies · Anthropological Studies and Insights · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Social Psychology
African philosophy
Philosophical Perspectives on Communalism and Morality in African Traditions
Tradition and Modernity
Making the Social World
Sex and Death
Staying Alive
Shared intention and personal intentions
The Concept of Mind
Collective Acceptance and the Is-Ought Argument
The Idea of Personhood in Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart
On the Construction of a Social Reality
An Oral Philosophy of Personhood
Radicals versus Moderates
Intentionalistic Explanations in the Social Sciences
Person, Personhood and Individual Rights in Menkiti’s African Communitarian Thinking
Revisiting the Menkiti-Gyekye Debate
Three Kinds of Social Kinds
Responses to Critics of The Construction of Social Reality
Sex and death
Reviving Whorf
Just What is Social Ontology
Mind-Dependent Kinds
Human Persons as Social Entities
Social ontology
Speech Acts
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |