Mental Life in the Space of Reasons

Dados Bibliográficos

ID8975899
AutoresBrinkmann (0000-0001-7579-1212, Aarhus University, autor correspondente), Svend Brinkmann
Ano2006
Volume36
Fascículo1
Páginas1-16
Data de publicação2006-03-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoJournal for the Theory of Social Behaviour (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0021-8308 • E-ISSN: 1468-5914
EditoraWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-5914.2006.00293.x
OpenAlexW1975504238
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas13
Referências citadas25

This paper argues the Wittgensteinian point that we can undo the psychologizing of psychology by conceiving of mental life as lived in the space of reasons. It is argued that mental life - human action, feeling and thinking - is constituted by normative connections and necessities rather than causal ones. The consequence is that mental life is irreducibly moral, and if the sciences of mental life are to become adequate to deal with their subject matter, they should construe themselves as what was once referred to as moral sciences. It is argued that the source of the normativity of mental life is found in historically evolved social practices, although not all normativity is conventional or historically contingent. Finally, some objections to the idea that mental life is normative are discussed; first, that this idea represents an intellectualist or rationalist fallacy, and second that it violates our conception of mental illness as something mental, yet outside the space of reasons

Epistemology · Linguistics · Psychoanalysis · Sociology · Space (punctuation) · Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology · Mental Health and Psychiatry · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Representations and Identity