Revisiting the moral forecasting error – A preregistered replication and extension of “Are we more moral than we think?”
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9004591 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Simen Bø (0000-0001-9076-5362, Norwegian School of Economics, corresponding author), Hallgeir Sjåstad (0000-0002-8730-1038, Norwegian School of Economics) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 115 |
| Pages | 104662-104662 |
| Publication date | 2024-09-02 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Experimental Social Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0022-1031 • E-ISSN: 1096-0465 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.jesp.2024.104662 |
| OpenAlex | W4402120806 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 29 |
Predictions are often inaccurate. Still, the direction of prediction errors may vary. Contrary to research on the intention-behavior gap, where people fail to live up to their ambitions, a study on “moral forecasting” found that people behaved more honestly than they predicted. In this registered report, we present two close replication attempts and one conceptual replication attempt of this moral forecasting error across two experiments. In Experiment 1 ( N = 1839), we recruited a general population sample from the same country as the original study (Canada) to an online experiment. We successfully replicated the moral forecasting error using a math-based cheating task from the original study: Predicted cheating was much higher in a moral forecasting condition than actual cheating in a moral action condition ( d = 0.69). In Experiment 2 ( N = 1381) we replicated the forecasting error again, using the same task in a general population sample from the U.S. ( d = 0.72). However, we were unable to conceptually replicate the effect using a different dishonesty measure, the “mind game”, in Experiment 1 (φ = 0.03). We also could not reduce the forecasting error through a debiasing intervention in Experiment 2 ( d = 0.01). Across both experiments, participants predicted that others would cheat much more than they would themselves. In this registered report, we conclude that the moral forecasting error is robust for the original cheating task. We also show that it can generalize contextually (from a lab to an online setting), but not to a different task. Future research may show exactly when predictions about one's own honesty are pessimistic rather than optimistic
Cheating · Cognitive psychology · Dishonesty · Population · Replicate · Replication (statistics · Sample (material · Statistics · Task (project management · Behavioral Health and Interventions · Optimism, Hope, and Well-being · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
The Intention–Behavior Gap
What we say and what we do
Affective Forecasting
Incentives and cheating
Making replication mainstream
Out of Control
Registered Reports
Taking Stock of Unrealistic Optimism
Active Transgressions and Moral Elusions
The Illusion of Moral Superiority
“Just letting you know … ” Underestimating others’ desire for constructive feedback
Motivated underpinnings of the impact bias in affective forecasts
The better-than-average effect in comparative self-evaluation
Many Labs 2
Examining the accuracy of lay beliefs about the effects of personality on prosocial behavior
Empirically derived guidelines for effect size interpretation in social psychology
The impact bias is alive and well
Unrealistic optimism about future life events
The case for motivated reasoning
Does changing behavioral intentions engender behavior change? A meta-analysis of the experimental evidence
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2026 - 2026 (1) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |