Responsibility gaps and self-interest bias

People attribute moral responsibility to AI for their own but not others' transgressions

Bibliographic Data

ID9007532
AuthorsMing Dong (0000-0001-8547-3808, Max Planck Institute for Human Development, corresponding author), Mengchen Dong, Konrad Bocian (0000-0002-8652-0167, Uniwersytet SWPS)
Year2023
Volume111
Pages104584-104584
Publication date2023-12-20
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueJournal of Experimental Social Psychology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0022-1031 • E-ISSN: 1096-0465
PublisherElsevier BV (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1016/j.jesp.2023.104584
OpenAlexW4390022082
LanguageEN
Citations received11
References cited50

In the last decade, the ambiguity and difficulty of responsibility attribution to AI and human stakeholders (i.e., responsibility gaps) has been increasingly relevant and discussed in extreme cases (e.g., autonomous weapons). On top of related philosophical debates, the current research provides empirical evidence on the importance of bridging responsibility gaps from a psychological and motivational perspective. In three pre-registered studies (N = 1259), we examined moral judgments in hybrid moral situations, where both a human and an AI were involved as moral actors and arguably responsible for a moral consequence. We found that people consistently showed a self-interest bias in the evaluation of hybrid transgressions, such that they judged the human actors more leniently when they were depicted as themselves (vs. others; Studies 1 and 2) and ingroup (vs. outgroup; Study 3) members. Moreover, this bias did not necessarily emerge when moral actors caused positive (instead of negative) moral consequences (Study 2), and could be accounted for by the flexible responsibility attribution to AI (i.e., ascribing more responsibility to AI when judging the self rather than others; Studies 1 and 2). The findings suggest that people may dynamically exploit the “moral wiggle room” in hybrid moral situations and reason about AI's responsibility to serve their self-interest

Ambiguity · Attribution · Epistemology · Ingroups and outgroups · Moral disengagement · Moral psychology · Moral responsibility · Perspective (graphical · Political science · Social cognitive theory of morality · Social responsibility · Death Anxiety and Social Exclusion · Law · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology

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