Existential and Cognitive Psychology Contrasting Views of Consciousness

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9021111
AutoresBrent D Slife (0000-0003-2676-6488, Baylor University, autor de correspondencia), Suzanne Barnard (0000-0002-8351-4474)
Año1988
Volumen28
Número3
Páginas119-136
Fecha de publicación1988-07-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaJournal of Humanistic Psychology (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0022-1678 • E-ISSN: 1552-650X
EditorialSAGE Publishing (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1177/0022167888283008
OpenAlexW2010461667
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas6
Referencias citadas24

Cognitive psychology is considered by some theorists to have subsumed "third force" views of consciousness. The purpose of the present article is to show that the cybernetic conceptions of cognitive psychology do not explain the qualities of consciousness considered fundamental to existentialists. It is our contention that feedback principles are inadequate to explain self-awareness, volition, and futurity. The core of this inadequacy lies in cognitive psychology's assumption about human reasoning. Cognitive psychologists are shown to rely exclusively upon demonstrative reasoning, whereas existential psychologists are shown to emphasize dialectical reasoning

Artificial consciousness · Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Consciousness · Demonstrative · Dialectic · Epistemology · Existentialism · Perceptual psychology · Philosophy of psychology · Social cognition · Volition (linguistics · Action Observation and Synchronization · Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Representations and Identity