The Demand for Local Public Health Services
Do Unified and Independent Public Health Departments Spend Differently
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9102867 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Laurie J Bates (Bryant University, corresponding author), Rexford E Santerre |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 46 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 590-596 |
| Publication date | 2008-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Medical Care (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0025-7079 • E-ISSN: 1537-1948 |
| Publisher | Ovid Technologies (Wolters Kluwer Health) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1097/mlr.0b013e318164944c |
| PMID | 18520313 |
| OpenAlex | W2029988059 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 11 |
OBJECTIVE: To identify the factors affecting the demand for local public health services and to compare the spending patterns of independent and unified public health departments. DATA SOURCES/STUDY SETTING: Cross-sectional data for 2004 from various public health departments in Connecticut. STUDY DESIGN: Uses probit analysis to examine the factors affecting the consolidation of public health departments. These results help correct for sample selection bias in the estimation of the demand for local public health services using multiple regression analysis. A simulation technique determines how much each independent public health department would be expected to spend upon joining a unified public health district. DATA COLLECTION: Data obtained from various government sources in Connecticut. Ninety-two of the municipalities participated in 18 different unified public health districts whereas 77 municipalities operated independent health departments. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Wealthier municipalities are less likely to consolidate health departments. Population and income differences among municipalities inhibit consolidation. The tax-share elasticity of the demand for local public health is approximately -1.28 and the income elasticity equals 0.27. Little difference in spending is found between unified and independent public health departments. CONCLUSIONS: Given that differences among communities inhibit the formation of public health districts, higher levels of government may have to offer financial inducements for communities to voluntarily join a district. The relatively large tax-share elasticity means that matching intergovernmental grants have the potential of stimulating the demand for local public health. An independent public health department is unlikely to experience a sharp spike in taxes upon joining a public health district
Business · Econometrics · Economics · Environmental health · Health promotion · Local government · Political science · Price elasticity of demand · Probit model · Public economics · Public finance · Public health · Health disparities and outcomes · Healthcare Policy and Management · Medicine · Nursing · Public Administration · Public Health Policies and Education · Health Policy
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,2 |
| Citation span | 2011 - 2024 (14) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |