Factual causation’ and ‘scope of liability’

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Bibliographic Data

ID9196835
AuthorsDavid Hamers (0000-0003-1422-7997, The University of Sydney, corresponding author), David Hamer
Year2014
Volume77
Issue2
Pages155-188
Publication date2014-03-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueModern Law Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0026-7961 • E-ISSN: 1468-2230
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/1468-2230.12063
OpenAlexW1944270142
LanguageEN
References cited36

According to a dominant view, for the negligent defendant to be held liable for the plaintiff's harm the plaintiff must establish first, that the breach was the ‘factual cause’ of the harm, and second, that the harm is within the ‘scope of liability’. On this view, factual causation is purely factual, while scope of liability is normative and non‐causal. This article accepts the basic two‐step approach, but argues that the distinction is overstated. A close analysis of the principles shows that factual causation may require value judgment, and that scope of liability often involves an assessment of the strength and nature of the causal connection between breach and harm

Causation · Epistemology · Harm · Law and economics · Liability · Normative · Plaintiff · Political science · Scope (computer science) · Sociology · Strict liability · Tort · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal principles and applications · Philosophy · Psychology

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