Why Shareholders Shouldn't Vote

A M arxist‐progressive Critique of Shareholder Empowerment

Bibliographic Data

ID9197284
AuthorsLorraine Talbot (corresponding author)
Year2013
Volume76
Issue5
Pages791-816
Publication date2013-09-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueModern Law Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0026-7961 • E-ISSN: 1468-2230
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/1468-2230.12036
OpenAlexW2153221664
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited32

This paper argues that liquidity, short‐termism and low involvement in corporate governance are fundamental ingredients of shareholders’ value maximisation strategies. Neither shareholders nor their representatives will voluntarily adopt restrictions which inhibit their ability to pursue these strategies, such as those presented by the S tewardship C odes. Utilising M arxist and progressive theory this paper evidences the tendency for all capital (including shares) to seek liquidity. It presents historical evidence which shows that political policy can either restrict this tendency, as it did in the progressive and post war period, or facilitate it, as it did in nineteenth century E ngland and in the current neoliberal period. The shareholder empowerment initiatives examined in this paper are therefore best understood as strategies to justify shareholder claims in the current crisis and to thereby protect the neoliberal status quo

Business · Capital (architecture) · Corporate governance · Economic growth · Economics · Empowerment · Law and economics · Market economy · Market liquidity · Marxist philosophy · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Shareholder · Shareholder resolution · Shareholder value · Status quo · Value (mathematics) · Accounting · Economic Theory and Policy · Finance · Housing, Finance, and Neoliberalism · Law · Political Economy and Marxism

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