Is There a Distinction between Reason and Emotion in Mencius

Bibliographic Data

ID9214971
AuthorsDavid B Wong (0000-0003-1309-167X, corresponding author)
Year1991
Volume41
Issue1
Pages31
Publication date1991-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy East and West (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8221 • E-ISSN: 1529-1898
PublisherJSTOR (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/1399716
OpenAlexW2330681459
LanguageEN
Citations received28

The contrast between reason and emotion has played a crucial role in the moral psychology of the Western ethical tradition.' If we turn to Mencius in the Confucian tradition, however, there seems to be no such contrast of comparable importance. Mencius does not, as Plato and Aristotle do, employ the contrast between reason and emotion to assert the need for the primacy of reason. He takes neither the Humean position of denying nor the Kantian position of affirming the motivational efficacy of pure practical reason.2 What stands out in Mencius' work is the absence of any to-do about the issue of reason versus emotion. A plausible explanation is that he never thought about the distinction between reason and emotion in the general way required by these issues. But failing to think of such a distinction may be a simple omission, with no further implications for either Mencius' philosophy or the viability of the distinction, or it may be that his philosophy supplies good reason for omitting such a distinction. I intend to argue for the latter possibility. Mencius held a picture of the role of emotion in moral motivation that militates against a general separation of reason from emotion. In particular, this picture implies that having an emotion such as compassion can involve the recognition of reasons to act in certain ways. The connection between emotion and recognizing reasons to act has important implications for what our larger conception of practical reason ought to be. This conception not only helps to shed light on Mencius, I shall argue, but is a plausible one on its own merits.3 In 2A:6 of the Meng Tzu four innate tendencies in human nature are identified as the fonts of the four major virtues. Mencius identifies the subject of each tendency as hsin, which stands for both the heart and the mind. The hsin that is sensitive to the sufferings of others is the beginnning of jen or benevolence. The hsin that feels shame and dislike is the beginning of i or righteousness. The hsin that feels modesty and courtesy is the beginning of li or propriety. The hsin that senses right and wrong is the beginning of chih or wisdom. Can we classify these tendencies as either affective or rational in nature

Epistemology · Chinese history and philosophy · Philosophy · Psychology

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