The Maha-Vibhasa Arguments for Sarvastivada

ties, dharmas, of the past and future are real, that is, are real now. Dharmas are short-lived or momentary happenings. The Sarvastivadins claimed that the present happening of a dharma is merely one phase in its existence. Hitherto it has existed in its future phase; when causes and conditions are ripe, it moves into its present phase, and then when the moment of its actualization is past it moves into the third phase of its history and becomes a past dharma. So at the present moment there exist not only present dharmas, that is, dharmas in their present phase (bhava), but also dharmas in their past and future phases. The experienced difference between these three modes of present existence is explained by a complex theory of different types of causal efficacy; the present bhava is characterized by a particularly strong kind of causality called karitra; dharmas in past and future bhavas are also causally efficacious, but in a different way. So, in this sense, past, present, and future dharmas are contemporaneous; but it is a 'reduced contemporaneity', for dharmas in past and future phases are less forceful than dharmas in the present phase. This doctrine was in direct opposition to the opinion of the Sthaviras and the Sautrantikas, that before its present moment of existence a dharma was nothing, and after this moment it will become nothing (abhutva bhavati, bhutva ca prativigacchati).1 Why did the Sarvastivadins hold their peculiar view about the real existence of past and future? This question expresses two linked types of puzzlement: to the philosopher the Sarvasti position may well seem inherently implausible, even bizarre; and the historian of Buddhist thought may find it difficult to understand why the matter should have been of any special concern to Buddhists. Why as Buddhists should the Sarvasti philosophers have been concerned to assert the present existence of past and future dharmas? While I am addressing the question of the Buddhist importance of the theory, I am also, especially in the final section, concerned with the more general philosophical question. A first step in understanding why the Sarvastivadins held their 'sarvasti' position must be to look at the arguments they themselves produced to defend this position. Historically we know of three phases in the development of their views: the original abhidharma texts (second century B.C.); the great commentary on these known as the Maha-vibhasa (first century A.D.); and the vigorous debate which arose from Vasuhandhu's account of their views, with mainly hostile commentary, in the Abhidharma-kosa (fifth century A.D.). Senior Lecturer in

Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Political science · Indian and Buddhist Studies · Indian History and Philosophy · Philosophy

• The first argument for Sarvāstivāda

  David Bastow•Asian Philosophy•1995

  Add to list