The As-If View of Economic Motivational Hypotheses

I. Introduction An economic motivational hypothesis ascribes a goal to economic agents of some specified type. Neoclassical microeconomic models regularly include motivational hypothesis. The model of rational consumer assumes that consumers to maximize their utility; model of purchasing behavior of a firm in a competitive factor market includes hypotheses that a firm desires to hire a quantity of a factor which maximizes firm profits; and so on. My aim here is to develop an interpretation of motivational hypotheses in neoclassical micro theory which I will call view. The as-if view has been presented before (Friedman, 1953). But I will develop view somewhat differently than has been done hitherto. In addition, an effort will be made to rebut some criticisms of as-if view which appear to remain unanswered. II. What As-if View Says The as-if view invites us to construe economic motivational hypotheses non-literally, though they do purport to be true. Let me be more precise. On as-if view, intentional terms such seek to maximize utility and desire to maximize profits occurring in economic motivational hypotheses are non-referential. A term E is non-referential in a class of sentences K each sentence in K can be construed so that its truth is consistent with there not existing anything denoted by E.(1) For example, term the average reader of is non-referential in all sentences containing term we wish to affirm. A true sentence like (1) The average reader of Forbes has a net worth of $1,374,138. is equivalent to (2) The sum of net worth of all readers of Forbes divided by number of readers of magazine is $1,374,138. To paraphrase (1) (2) indicates that truth of (1) is consistent with there not really existing anything denoted by the average reader of Forbes. The existence of live, flesh and blood readers of Forbes is really all that is needed to make (1) true. Again, as-if view says that intentional terms such seek to maximize profits occurring in economic motivational hypotheses are non-referential. But how are economic motivational hypotheses like firms to maximize profits to be paraphrased so that intentional terms such seek to maximize profits are non-referential? The equivalence of (1) and (2) above affords what Bertrand Russell would have called a in of the average reader of Forbes. is not possible to offer a definition in use of intentional terms in economic motivational hypotheses. But an alternative is available. Consider following sentence affirmed of a hummingbird. (3) The hummingbird that feeder still has sugar solution in it. One way to construe (3) so that its truth is consistent with intentional term believes that feeder still has sugar solution in not denoting anything, is to view (3) equivalent to (4) is hummingbird that feeder still has sugar solution in it. The hummingbird's behavior say, poking its beak into feeder may justify (4). But (4) is compatible with believes that feeder still has sugar solution in not denoting hummingbirds or anything else. Let us call statements of form -- or of form It is --. Generally speaking, as-if statements can be true even though what follows term as if is false. Suppose Jack, an accused murderer, is putting on a clever act to deceive psychiatrists who will testify at his upcoming trial. We may say is behaving he is insane. This remark can be true even though Jack is not insane at all. Thus, (4) above can be true even though intentional term believes that feeder still has sugar solution in denotes nothing. Now, since (4) is compatible with intentional term occurring in it being non-denoting, and (3) is being viewed equivalent to (4), then (3) too is compatible with believes that feeder still has sugar solution in being non-denoting

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