Violence, Dignity and Mali's New Model Army, 1960-68

VIOLENCE, DIGNITY AND MALI'S NEW MODEL ARMY, 1960-681 Gregory Mann Independenceexception.nationalistcamestruggle,Tradesoftlyunionists,andtomostitwasWestmerchants,aformerAfricanteacherandstates,bureaucratswhoandmovedMaliledintowasthetheno exception.Tradeunionists,merchants,andbureaucratsledthe nationaliststruggle,anditwasaformerteacherwhomovedintothe governor'smansion,asSoudanFrançaisbecameMali.Yet,paradoxicallyfora countrythatwonitsindependencepeacefully,thenation'sfirstregimewasdeeply investedinthemanagementofviolence.Asaninitialstepinabroaderprojecton theplaceofviolenceinthepoliticallifeofpost-colonialMali,thispaperseeksto understandthatparadox.Italsosetsthepublicfaceofmanagedviolenceagainst dignity,itsmostessentialcounterpart.Thesetwocharacteristicsprovedtobe essentialyetconflictingelementsofanAfricanpoliticsofautonomy.2 SinceFrantzFanon,revolutionaryviolencehasoftenbeenreadasa legitimatemeanstoanall-importantend:nationalliberation.3ButFanonwrote inheadytimes,andthepurifyingviolenceheadvocatedwasdirectedatsettler regimes,and-moreabstractly,butnolessimportantly-athealinga'national psyche'woundedbycolonialism.Inthiscontext,itdidnotdestroy,butrestored. Morerecently,andmuchmorecynically,AchilleMbembehasarguedthat violenceisoneelementofatrinityofphenomenainwhichpost-colonialAfrican politicshavebecomegrounded.Inthisreading,controloverviolence-along withtheprivateallocationofpublicresourcesandintricatetransfersofwealth alongsocialandpoliticalaxes-isacrucialtechniqueforthemaintenance,and eventhecontest,ofstatepowerincontemporaryAfricanpost-colonies(Mbembe 2001,esp.39-52). BothFanon'sferventvisionandMbembe'sdarkeranalysisare symptomaticofthemomentsoftheirproduction.Bothalsobegthequestion, whatweretherolesofviolenceanddignityinAfrica'sself-styledrevolutionary regimes?Inatimeofgreatpossibility,enthusiasm,andimagination,whatrole didarmiesandparamilitaryorganizationsplayinnewnationslikeMali?More specifically,howdidtheorganizationschargedwithmanagingviolencecarryout theirtasks,andwhatconflictsarosebetweenthem?Andfinally-sinceweknow thatinMalithestorytookanabruptturnwiththecoupd'étatof19November 1968-whatroledidthemilitaryplay,notonlyinendingModiboKeita'sregime, butalsoinitsbeginnings,andoverthecourseofitsexistence? 'Armed Forces' of the Revolution4 One of the paradoxes of Keita's regime is that, while it did not emerge through revolutionary struggle, it was sustained by the threat and the management of violence. Despite the facts that its leaders distrusted many current and former Mande Studies 5 (2003) pp. 65-82 66 Gregory Mann soldiers and that they themselves had v regime depended heavily on its armed From the 1960 deployment to the Con vicious, bitter struggle against the Tu played a prominent role in asserting t on the continent. By the mid-1960s, French intelligence services estimated that Mali had one of the most powerful armies in West Africa, and as foreign powers competed for local influence, the country fairly bristled with weapons.6 Yet the army was only one element in an array of armed forces, which included youth brigades ( Brigades de Vigilance ), popular militias (, Milice populaire ), and regimented rural labor forces (the Service Civique Rurale or SCR). Its relations with the paramilitary organizations were not always easy. Under the First Republic, the army juggled competing expectations: Was it to be a professional and apolitical organization or a political instrument? What exactly was it intended to serve and defend - the state, the party, or the revolution? Were its men soldiers, laborers, or both? The questions posed by the creation of a new model of an African army would never be entirely resolved, and the tensions they provoked - as well as the competition between various paramilitary organizations and the army - would hasten the fall of the regime. Structure and Numbers Partly inherited from French colonial military tradition, the armed forces of the new state were divided into several branches, each of which fell under one or another of the civilian ministers, or, eventually, under Keita himself. Only the Army - the largest single branch - came under the authority of the Minister of National Defense. Some of the attributions of authority made sense - for instance, the Service Civique Rurale was responsible to the High Commissioner for Youth ( Haut-Commissaire de la Jeunesse ), Moussa Keita, brother of Modibo. In theoiy, the Milice and the Brigades de Vigilance answered to the High Commissioner for Y outh and later to the Minister of the Interior. The Republican Guard also answered to the Minister of the Interior, while the Gendarmerie, which had originally also fallen in the purview of that Minister, was eventually placed under the President himself.7 The total number of members - loosely defined - of the armed forces, forces publiques , and paramilitary organizations was thought in the mid-1960s to number around 1415 ,000, distributed as below (note that the Brigades de Vigilance were not listed as a separate unit).8 Mali's New Model Army 67 Branch Strength (est) Ministry Army 4,500 National Defense Milice 3,500 Youth; Interior Service Civique Rurale 3,500 Youth Garde Républicaine 1,900 Interior Gendarmerie 800 Defense or Interior Police 600 Interior Total 14,800 Creating an Indep The most professional o product of the colonial m Sudan, Mali's army em organizational innovati commandos autonomes (C decentralized, and logisti throughout the national suggested to outside analy Malian population as it aggression.9 Mali's army was compos tir ailleurs Sénégalais) an the French empire in V recruits would soon gain mid-1960s, in a nation composed of a large perc easy for former colonial new national army. By the late 1950s, the t original incarnation as an name " tirailleurs " had fa of citizen-volunteers who were

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