The First Principles of the Natural Law and Bioethics

This essay elaborates a sound account of first principles of practical reason and demonstrates its relevance for bioethics. After correcting a misinterpretation of Aquinas, the essay argues that natural law theory is firstly concerned with the foundations of practical reason and thus suitable for use in bioethics. Practical reason, unlike speculative reason, is inherently related to the appetites (reason directed to action). The ends or goods with which it is first concerned signify desirable possibilities, which are grasped preceptively as goods to be done and pursued—such as life, truth, friendship, procreation and education of children, religion, and practical reasonableness. Their contraries are grasped as evils to be avoided. These goods constitute the intelligible origin of all purposeful behavior and are the basis for moral norms. Identifying what good or goods are at stake in bioethical questions and how those goods are influenced by actions, technologies, practices, and mindsets is foundational for doing bioethics well. Finally, they make intelligible the existence of ethical prohibitions. Notwithstanding the range of norms that bind only for members of special communities or groups, these core goods and the first principles specified by them are not relative to culture, groups, or individuals

Action (physics · Bioethics · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Natural (archaeology · Natural law · Political science · Practical reason · Relevance (law · Sociology · Cross-Cultural and Social Analysis · Law · Philosophy

• The Ergon Inference

  Alfonso Gómez-Lobo•Phronesis•1989

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