State Morality in International Relations

Much has recently been said concerning the moral obligations of the state. It is not infrequently asserted that it is the moral duty of a state to assume some function in the interest of international society. The reaction against the philosophy which considered all state action as moral and which posited the realization of national aims as a paramount ethical end, has been followed by an increasing emphasis on the ethical liability of the state to interests in addition to its own. In attributing moral obligations to the state, the ethical standards of the individual are frequently invoked as applicable to state conduct, and upon this analogy judgment is often pronounced on problems of international right and wrong. The question, however, defies settlement by this simple identification of two moral entities essentially dissimilar in their nature. The ascription of ethical duties to the state, wholesome as it is readily conceded to be, requires considerable analysis lest an undue inference be drawn from the mere fact of its admission. To concede the state as a moral entity does not of itself suffice. The manner of its response to moral questions; its distinctive position in a society which yet lacks many of the elemental requisites for moral progress; the forces limiting the movement of international ethics to a higher level—an inquiry into problems such as these would seem more profitable than the constant reiteration of a principle which probably few persons would longer be disposed to deny

Action (physics · Analogy · Ascription · Duty · Epistemology · Law and economics · Liability · Morality · Political science · Sociology · State (computer science · Global Peace and Security Dynamics · Law · Philosophy

• Ethics and international relations

  Open Access•Stephen Ching-Kiu Chan, Stephen Chan•Political Geography•1998

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