Why Seeing Is Not Believing and Why Believing Is Seeing

On the Politics of Sight

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9430946
AutoresPablo P Castelló (0000-0003-2882-9112, Queen's University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2024
Volumen119
Número1
Páginas124-134
Fecha de publicación2024-03-07
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaAmerican Political Science Review (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0003-0554 • E-ISSN: 1537-5943
EditorialCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0003055423001491
OpenAlexW4392560981
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas26

Social movements often appeal to the politics of sight, meaning that if people knew about a given injustice, political transformation would follow. Jasmine English and Bernardo Zacka articulate two central premises of the politics of sight: “(1) exposing morally repugnant practices will make us see them, (2) seeing such practices will stop us from acquiescing to them.” Considering the case of slaughterhouse workers, Timothy Pachirat and English and Zacka challenge the previous premises. This article complements their contributions by theorizing what I call Western conceptuality/language and the role this plays in forming our subjectivities not to recognize violence on the one hand, and to be sovereign masters over animals on the other. I conclude by discussing the political implications of these arguments for the politics of sight, including the role of concealment and exposure, and the conditions needed for humans to see animals in their full ethical weight

Epistemology · Optics · Physics · Political science · Politics · Sight · Geographies of human-animal interactions · Law · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology