Double-Standard Moralism
Why We Can Be More Permissive Within Our Imagination
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9466896 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Mattia Cecchinato (0009-0009-1207-4203, University of Oxford, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 64 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 67-87 |
| Publication date | 2023-02-24 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal of Aesthetics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0904 • E-ISSN: 1468-2842 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1093/aesthj/ayad008 |
| OpenAlex | W4378363334 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 21 |
Although the fictional domain exhibits a prima facie freedom from real-world moral constraints, certain fictive imaginings seem to deserve moral criticism. Capturing both intuitions, this paper argues for double-standard moralism, the view that fictive imaginings are subject to different moral standards than their real-world counterparts. I show how no account has, thus far, offered compelling reasons to warrant the moral appropriateness of this discrepancy. I maintain that the normative discontinuity between fiction and the actual world is moderate, as opposed to one that leaves fictive engagements wholly exempt from moral evaluations. I propose a way of addressing the gamer’s dilemma that is compatible with a moderate kind of discontinuity. Finally, I contend that the audience is justified in adopting deviant moral attitudes in fictional situations because their consequences largely differ from those that analogous real-world events would have
Aesthetics · Criticism · Dilemma · Epistemology · Moral dilemma · Morality · Normative · Permissive · Political science · Prima facie · Sociology · Subject (documents · Warrant · Computer Science · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art · Law · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |