Charles K. Armstrong. Tyranny of the Weak

This book is an exceptional contribution to the understanding of North Korea's independent diplomacy during the Cold War period. Not only is Charles K. Armstrong's analysis framed in a synthetic way, but his use of underexplored and underused primary materials reveals the unknown roots of the weak state's known behavior. Armstrong explains that North Korea's self-reliance on the diplomatic front was a result of both its own developmental path and its ability to resist more powerful states. He shows that North Korean diplomacy was not merely a response to the politics of the great powers, and that in fact North Korea used the splits, mistrusts, and antagonisms among the great powers for its own benefit. “North Korea,” Armstrong aptly notes, “has defied all ‘imperial logics’” (p. 291). The book deals chronologically with most of the Cold War period except for the short period between the division of the Korean peninsula after World War II and the beginning of the Korean War. (That period is the topic of another book by the author, The North Korean Revolution, 1945–1950 [2004].) Armstrong lucidly illustrates North Korea's niche diplomacy in the Sino-Soviet dispute, its engagement in the nonaligned movement, and its adventurous, and provocative, policies toward both South Korea and the United States. The scope of the book is comprehensive, and the materials that Armstrong uses are diverse, including newly explored German and Russian materials and some underused U.S. declassified documents.

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