Independent agencies? Political vulnerability and affinity of their leaders
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9537526 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Eliška Klimentová (0000-0003-1657-6357, Charles University, corresponding author), Petra Tomanová (0000-0001-8072-3193, Prague University of Economics and Business) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 59 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 671-693 |
| Publication date | 2024-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Acta Politica (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0001-6810 • E-ISSN: 1741-1416 |
| Publisher | Springer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1057/s41269-023-00303-9 |
| OpenAlex | W4381614814 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 27 |
Are the leaders of independent agencies independent in practice? Are the independence requirements set out in legislation a guarantee of de facto independence? This paper reveals the relationship between de iure independence and de facto independence of independent agencies through two dimensions: political affinity and political vulnerability of their leaders. Our analysis reveals how the de iure independence of an agency affects the probability that agency heads will have connections to political parties and whether their mandates will end prematurely in a period of political transition, i.e., when a new government takes office. It also determines whether the biographical profile of agency heads (PhD degree, bureaucratic background, and political affiliation) can influence their security of tenure when governments change, and hence their independence. This is supported by an empirical evaluation of independent authorities in the Czech Republic between 1993 and 2021
Agency (philosophy · Bureaucracy · Comparative politics · Computer security · De facto · Government (linguistics · Independence (probability theory · Legislation · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Social science · Sociology · Statistics · Vulnerability (computing · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Legal and Constitutional Studies · Public Administration · Regulation and Compliance Studies
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Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy
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Robust Inference With Multiway Clustering
Rules Rather than Discretion
The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Capitalism
The rise of the regulatory state in Europe
The Third Force? Independent Regulatory Agencies and Elected Politicians in Europe
Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions
Credibility, Complexity and Uncertainty
The Formal Independence of Regulators
De facto independence after delegation
Formal independence of regulatory agencies andVarieties ofCapitalism
Are regulatory agencies independent in practice? Evidence from board members in Spain
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From the Positive to the Regulatory State
The Politicization of Regulatory Agencies
Measuring the formal independence of regulatory agencies
Policy credibility and delegation to independent regulatory agencies
Explaining regulatory autonomy in EU network sectors
Political Independence, Accountability, and the Quality of Regulatory Decision-Making
The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Agencies
Credibility Versus Control
Explaining the De Facto Independence of Public Broadcasters
The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |