The Executive’s Misplaced Reliance on War Powers “Custom”
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9544898 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael J Glennon (Council of Science Editors, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 109 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 551-556 |
| Publication date | 2015-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of International Law (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0002-9300 • E-ISSN: 2161-7953 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.5305/amerjintelaw.109.3.0551 |
| OpenAlex | W2412895391 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 2 |
Historical practice, or custom, has long been seen as a source of authority in the resolution of separation-of-powers disputes. In two recent cases assessing the limits to the president’s power regarding the recognition of foreign nations and the making of recess appointments, the Supreme Court heavily emphasized past practice. Historical practice, the Court said, reflects “the compromises and working arrangementsth at the elected branches of Government themselves have reached.” in the realm of war powers, the executive branch has long relied on custom to justify military initiatives that were carried out without congressional approval. In essence, the executive has argued that because force has been used in the past without congressional approval, the same is permissible in various other situations (for example, in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Haiti, Kosovo, and Panama)
Executive power · Government (linguistics · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Realm · Separation of powers · Supreme court · American Constitutional Law and Politics · International Law and Aviation · International Law and Human Rights · Law
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |