Short Supply Conditions and the Law of International Trade

Economic Lessons from the Pandemic

Bibliographic Data

ID9545818
AuthorsAlan O Sykes (International Law Institute, corresponding author)
Year2020
Volume114
Issue4
Pages647-656
Publication date2020-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueAmerican Journal of International Law (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0002-9300 • E-ISSN: 2161-7953
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/ajil.2020.61
OpenAlexW3121833754
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited3

The COVID-19 pandemic has been accompanied by shortages and potential shortages of products critical to the public health response. Many nations have responded with export restrictions on these products, restrictions that are permitted under international trade law as a temporary response to short supply conditions generally and to public health emergencies in particular. This Essay argues that such export restrictions are economically counterproductive from a global efficiency perspective, and that governments acting unilaterally will nevertheless employ them due to international externalities that propagate through the “terms of trade.” This observation raises a puzzle as to why international law should facilitate rather than curtail them. The most plausible answer is that legal authority for such measures is a politically necessary “escape clause” in trade agreements, akin to safeguard measures

Business · Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19 · Economic shortage · Economics · Externality · International economics · International trade · International trade law · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Pandemic · Perspective (graphical · Safeguard · World Trade Organization Law