Foreign Affairs and the Political Question Doctrine
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9546534 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael J Glennon (University of California System, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1989 |
| Volume | 83 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 814-821 |
| Publication date | 1989-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | American Journal of International Law (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0002-9300 • E-ISSN: 2161-7953 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2203370 |
| OpenAlex | W2313269681 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
The unevenness of congressional oversight, the proclivity of executive foreign affairs agencies for violating the law and the traditional responsibility of the courts as the last guardians of the Constitution—all point to the propriety of an active role for the judiciary in ensuring governmental compliance with the law. Specifically, courts should not decline to resolve foreign affairs disputes between Congress and the President because they present “political questions.” The recent case of Lowry v. Reagan illustrates the serious systemic damage wrought by judicial abstention in such disputes
Compliance (psychology · Constitution · Doctrine · Executive branch · Foreign policy · Political science · Politics · International Law and Aviation · Judicial and Constitutional Studies · Law · Legal Systems and Judicial Processes
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,07 |
| Citation span | 1997 - 2009 (13) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |