Consciousness and Behaviourism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9620157 |
|---|---|
| Authors | J D Keehn (American University of Beirut, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1964 |
| Volume | 55 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 89-91 |
| Publication date | 1964-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | British Journal of Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-1269 • E-ISSN: 2044-8295 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.2044-8295.1964.tb00901.x |
| OpenAlex | W2035428368 |
| Language | EN |
It has been argued, especially recently by Burt, that behaviourism is untenable because the concept of consciousness cannot be denied. This argument is rejected because the functional behaviourism of B. F. Skinner not only does not reject consciousness but includes an account of how behaviour made to private, conscious, experience can be brought under public control. A simple example of how behaviour to private stimuli can be controlled through the use of collateral stimuli is described. Fuller accounts are available in the references given
Argument (complex analysis) · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Collateral · Consciousness · Control (management) · Epistemology · Law · Neuroscience · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |