A ‘Crespi Effect’ in Male Imbeciles

In order to test the effects on performance of an interchange in incentive level forty male imbeciles were divided into four equal matched groups on the basis of two initial trials on a simple dexterity task. For a further ten trials two groups worked under non‐incentive conditions and two under incentive conditions, in which they were encouraged to reach a goal based on their previous performance. On the last trial one incentive group was changed to control conditions and one control group to incentive conditions, the other two groups continuing as before. The experiment was continued for a further seven trials. Results indicated that groups given the incentive from the beginning of learning separated significantly from those receiving no incentive. When one of the latter groups was given an incentive, however, its performance increase showed a typical Crespi type ‘elation’ effect, performance reaching, and maintaining, a level greater than that of subjects who had received the incentive from the beginning of learning. The effect was found to be a group trend rather than a response typical of all subjects. A comparable decrease in incentive level was found to have little marked effect on performance level, which established itself at a point intermediate between the performance levels of subjects who continued to receive an incentive and of subjects who had received no incentive at all. This finding confirmed earlier work with defectives, showing that incentives would have relatively permanent effects on the attitude or set, and hence on the performance level of imbeciles

Control (management) · Economics · Incentive · Incentive program · Microeconomics · Order (exchange) · Artificial Intelligence · Behavioral and Psychological Studies · Computer Science · Demography · Finance · Psychology · Social and Intergroup Psychology · Social Psychology