Ukraine’s drive to independence in 1991
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9640943 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David R Marples (University of Alberta, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 61 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 321-345 |
| Publication date | 2019-07-03 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Canadian Slavonic Papers (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0008-5006 • E-ISSN: 2375-2475 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00085006.2019.1636629 |
| OpenAlex | W2968755208 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 5 |
The article provides a re-examination of how Ukraine achieved independence in 1991, covering events both in the republic and at the centre in Moscow. It argues that success in 1991 was largely based on a compromise between various forces, including the Communist Party of Ukraine and the democratic opposition, but in turn the failure to address several basic issues, such as the status of Crimea and the centralization of power around the Communist and post-Communist elite, paved the way for the Euromaidan uprising of 2013–14. Virtually all the factors that resulted in protests and conflict in spring 2014 were present in some form in 1988–91 and remained unresolved in the years that followed the declaration of independence
Communism · Compromise · Democracy · Economic history · Elite · Independence (probability theory · Opposition (politics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Sociology · European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies · European Politics and Security · History · Law · Post-Soviet Geopolitical Dynamics
| Citations per year | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2025 - 2026 (2) |
| Highly cited | No |