Ethical Analysis in Plato's Earlier Dialogues

In the dialogues earlier than the Republic , Plato indicates in many ways his lack of confidence that any method of ethical analysis will lead to a discovery of the truth. The doubts which he expresses or implies have not always been given the attention which they deserve, and there has often been a reluctance to accept them as an expression of Plato's genuine conviction. There is, admittedly, some justification for this reluctance. Plato does not always seem to be consistent. In his attitude towards the results attainable by the use of a method of joint inquiry, he is sometimes extremely optimistic, at other times sceptical; and it seems a not unreasonable explanation of his scepticism to ascribe it to his desire to preserve a consistent portrait of the ‘ignorant’ Socrates. Thus the hesitation and reserve with which Plato immediately qualifies his dogmatic presentation of the theory of ⋯ν⋯μνησις in the Meno is explicable as a concession to dramatic realism. His reference to the method discussed in the Phaedo as a δε⋯τερος πλο⋯ς may be dismissed as ‘ironical’, as ‘the habitual playful selfdepreciation of Socrates’. The purpose of this paper is to suggest that the development of Plato's views on method in the dialogues as far as the Republic can be traced more consistently if we accept Plato's doubts, as well as his optimism, about ethical analysis, as the expression of his genuine conviction

Conviction · Epistemology · Expression (computer science · Form of the Good · Political science · Skepticism · SOCRATES · The Republic · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Law · Philosophy