Pleasure and the Divided Soul in Plato's Republic Book 9

Bibliographic Data

ID9666389
AuthorsBrooks Sommerville (University of British Columbia, corresponding author)
Year2019
Volume69
Issue1
Pages147-166
Publication date2019-05-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Classical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0009-8388 • E-ISSN: 1471-6844
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0009838819000582
OpenAlexW2972029287
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited20

In Book 9 of Plato's Republic we find three proofs for the claim that the just person is happier than the unjust person. Curiously, Socrates does not seem to consider these arguments to be coequal when he announces the third and final proof as ‘the greatest and most decisive of the overthrows’ (μέγιστόν τε καὶ κυριώτατον τῶν πτωμάτων) (583b7). This remark raises a couple of related questions for the interpreter. Whatever precise sense we give to μέγιστον and κυριώτατον in this passage, Socrates is clearly appealing to an argumentative standard of some kind, and claiming that his final argument alone meets (or comes closest to meeting) this standard. But what precise standard is Socrates invoking here? And given that the first two arguments of Book 9 fall short of this (as yet undetermined) standard, why does he not simply leap directly to the third, most decisive proof

Argument (complex analysis · Argumentative · Epistemology · Mathematical proof · Pleasure · SOCRATES · Soul · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Historical Philosophy and Science · Mathematics · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Philosophy · Psychology

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