Teoria dos jogos e política comparada

Novas perspectivas, velhos interesses

Bibliographic Data

ID9684559
AuthorsGerardo L Munck (0000-0001-5462-6488, University of Illinois Chicago, corresponding author)
Year2000
Volume43
Issue3
Pages559-600
Publication date2000-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueDados (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0011-5258 • E-ISSN: 1678-4588
PublisherFapUNIFESP (SciELO) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1590/s0011-52582000000300005
OpenAlexW2001402050
SCIELO_PIDS0011-52582000000300005
LanguagePT
References cited80

Seeking to conduct an inventory of the arguments used by game theory proponents, the article assesses both this theory and a set of theoretical principles that extend the scope from rational choice to interdependent decision-making and a type of formal methodology. The article identifies some key qualities, like the theory s emphasis on actors and strategic choices and its ability to generate logically rigorous and internally consistent predictions. But it also discusses many of the theory s shortcomings. Therefore, the challenge faced by scholars of comparative politics is to consider the new perspectives offered by game theory and to make use of its qualities, without losing sight of a series of relevant long-standing issues from the social sciences that this approach is not prepared to solve

Political science · Corruption and Economic Development · International Development and Aid · Political Conflict and Governance

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