Limiting Civilian Casualties as Part of a Winning Strategy
The Case of Courageous Restraint
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9684913 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Joseph H Felter (0000-0001-9035-7107, JOSEPH H. FELTER is Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, and Codirector of the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project. He is a retired U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel who led the International Security and Assistance Force, Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance Team in Afghanistan. He has published articles in journals such as the Journal of Political Economy, Journal of Conflict Resolution), Joseph Felter (Center for Strategic and International Studies, corresponding author), Jacob N Shapiro (0000-0002-7484-229X, Institute of Semitic Studies) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 146 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 44-58 |
| Publication date | 2017-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Daedalus (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0011-5266 • E-ISSN: 1548-6192 |
| Publisher | MIT Press - Journals (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1162/daed_a_00421 |
| OpenAlex | W2571261906 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 15 |
Military commanders in wartime have moral obligations to abide by international norms and humanitarian laws governing their treatment of noncombatants. How much risk to their own forces they must take to limit harm to civilians in the course of military operations, however, is unclear. The principle of proportionality in the law of armed conflict all but necessitates that they make a utilitarian calculation: potential harm to civilians must always be balanced against military value when considering actions that could hurt innocents. In asymmetric conflicts, such as most counterinsurgencies, information flows, collaboration, and ultimately the support of the local population can be key to achieving strategic objectives. Thus, limiting casualties to noncombatants and other actions that alienate the population in these types of conflicts is a key part of a winning strategy. The concept of “courageous restraint” was created to express this principle to NATO and U.S. forces fighting in Afghanistan
Civilian population · Harm · International humanitarian law · International law · Law and economics · Limiting · Political science · Population · Proportionality (law · Sociology · Value (mathematics · Computer Science · Engineering · Law · Military and Defense Studies · Torture, Ethics, and Law · War, Ethics, and Justification
Counterterrorism and Preventive Repression
Civilian Harm, Wartime Informing, and Counterinsurgent Operations
Weighing Lives in War
What Restrains Military from Targeting Civilians in Civil Wars
Introduction
Combatant rank and socialization to norms of restraint
What Explains Counterterrorism Effectiveness? Evidence from the U.S. Drone War in Pakistan
From Casualty Aversion to Civilian Protection
Inconstant Care
Civilians, Control, and Collaboration during Civil Conflict
Not Just a War Theory
Rwanda's War in Mozambique
Do mercenaries perform better than states? Evaluating the Wagner group's impact on Central African Republic
Legitimacy of violence
Combatant socialization and norms of restraint
| Citations per year | 1.88 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2018 - 2026 (9) |
| Highly cited | No |