Self-Consciousness and Phenomenal Character

Bibliographic Data

ID9686310
AuthorsGreg Janzen (University of Calgary, corresponding author)
Year2005
Volume44
Issue4
Pages707-733
Publication date2005-01-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueDialogue (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0012217300000056
OpenAlexW2152590339
LanguageEN
References cited29

This article defends two theses: that a mental state is conscious if and only if it has phenomenal character, i.e., if and only if there is something it is like for the subject to be in that state, and that all state consciousness involves selfconsciousness, in the sense that a mental state is conscious if and only if its possessor is, in some suitable way, conscious of being in it. Though neither of these theses is novel, there is a dearth of direct arguments for them in the scholarly literature and the relationship between them has so far gone underrecognized. This article attempts to remedy this lack, advancing the claim that if all conscious states have phenomenal character, then all state consciousness involves self-consciousness

Altered state · Character (mathematics) · Cognitive science · Consciousness · Epistemology · Mental state · Sociology · State (computer science) · Subject (documents) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Historical Philosophy and Science · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

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