Gauthier and the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9686396 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Steven Kuhn, Steven T Kuhn (Georgetown University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 55 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 659-676 |
| Publication date | 2016-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217316000603 |
| OpenAlex | W2565504308 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 14 |
The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) plays a central, but shifting, role in David Gauthier’s moral theorizing. In “Morality and Advantage,” it provides a model, demonstrating how morality can have seemingly contradictory properties. In Morals by Agreement , it poses a special problem for the view that moral behaviour is individually rational. Authorities on game theory have subsequently disputed the idea that the PD is an appropriate tool for thinking about moral theory. In the first part of this paper, I examine the roles of the PD in Gauthier’s writings. In the second part, I outline a project, with both descriptive and normative components, that develops the insights of “Morality and Advantage” while preserving it from the game theorists’ attack
Dilemma · Economics · Epistemology · Game theory · Law and economics · Mathematical economics · Moral dilemma · Morality · Normative · Positive economics · Prisoner's dilemma · Sociology · Superrationality · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Social Psychology · War, Ethics, and Justification
Modeling Rationality, Morality, and Evolution
Evolution of the Social Contract
Natural Justice
The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare
Practical Rationality and Preference
The Prisoner's Dilemma
The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure
Evolution of the Social Contract
Morality and Advantage
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |