Davidson on Pure Intending
A Non-Reductionist Judgement-Dependent Account
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9686408 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ali Hossein Khani (0000-0002-0537-3805, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 61 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 369-391 |
| Publication date | 2022-08-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217321000214 |
| OpenAlex | W3189563727 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 76 |
I will argue that Davidson's account of pure intending can be construed as a first-person-based judgement-dependent account of intention. For Davidson, pure intending to do φ is to make an all-out judgement that φing is desirable. On this anti-reductionist account, intention is treated as an irreducible state of the subject. I will draw a comparison between this account and Wright's and I will show that Davidson's account can be viewed as a non-reductionist judgement-dependent account along the lines suggested by Wright. I then explain how this account can help deal with various perplexities in Davidson's later view of meaning and mental content
Content (measure theory) · Epistemology · Judgement · Meaning (existential) · Reductionism · Subject (documents) · Wright · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
Truth and Interpretation
Willing, Wanting, Waiting
Knowledge and its Limits
Springs Of Action
Knowing One's Own Mind
Rational Animals
The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity
Intention and Agency
The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays
The Philosophy of Michael Dummett
Faces of Intention
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language
Realism and Anti-Realism in Davidson's Philosophy of Language, II
Realism and Anti-Realism in Davidson's Philosophy of Language, I
Davidson on Self‐Knowledge
Intending
Ways of Meaning
Interpretationism and judgement-dependence
Primary qualities, secondary qualities and the truth about intention
Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind
Essays on Davidson
Literary Theory after Davidson
The Judgment of a Weak Will
Action, Emotion and Will
Actions, Reasons, and Causes
Best Opinion and Intentional States
Davidson on First-Person Authority
Triangulating With Davidson
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |