What Goes Wrong in Habermas’s Pragmatic Justification of (U)
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9686655 |
|---|---|
| Authors | JUVÉNAL NDAYAMBAJE (0000-0001-8061-7817, UCLouvain, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2017 |
| Volume | 56 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 89-110 |
| Publication date | 2017-03-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s001221731700004x |
| OpenAlex | W2580781545 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 8 |
In his moral theory, named ‘discourse ethics,’ Jürgen Habermas holds that a norm is morally valid only when it is universalizable. He establishes the principle of universalization (U) as the procedural principle for testing the moral validity of norms in moral discourse. He argues that this principle can be derived from the pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation in general. By explicating the fiduciary status of pragmatic presuppositions of argumentation, and by distinguishing perspectival from comprehensive universalization, I argue that Habermas fails to justify his moral principle
Argumentation theory · Ascription · Discourse ethics · Epistemology · Expressivism · Norm (philosophy) · Presupposition · Sociology · Universalization · Critical Theory and Philosophy · Philosophy · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Highly cited | No |
|---|