The Singular Relational plus Relativistic Content View

My aim is to defend a peculiar epistemic version of the particularity thesis, which results from a sui generis combination of what I call the ‘singular relational view’ and what I call the ‘relativistic content view.’ Particulars are not represented as part of putative singular content. Instead, we are perceptually acquainted with them in the relevant sense that experience puts us in direct perceptual contact with them. And the content of experience is best modelled as a propositional function, that is, the content of a complex predicate that is true or false only relative to some circumstances of evaluation

Content (measure theory) · Content analysis · Epistemology · Function (biology) · Mathematical analysis · Perception · Predicate (mathematical logic) · Pure mathematics · Social science · Sociology · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology

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