Interests, Disagreement and Epistemic Risk
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9687027 |
|---|---|
| Authors | KARYN L FREEDMAN (0000-0002-6187-5543, University of Guelph, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2013 |
| Volume | 52 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 587-604 |
| Publication date | 2013-09-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217313000681 |
| OpenAlex | W2107055168 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 15 |
In this paper, I develop an interest-relative theory of justification in order to answer the question, “How can I maintain that P when someone whom I consider to be my epistemic peer maintains that not-P?” The answer to this question cannot be determined by looking at evidence alone, I argue, since justification cannot be determined by looking at evidence alone. Rather, in order to determine whether a subject S is justified in believing that P at time t, we need to assess her evidence in favour of P in proportion to her interest in P
Economics · Epistemology · Order (exchange) · Subject (documents) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 5
Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others
Knowledge and Practical Interests
Evidentialism
Reason Without Freedom
Peer Disagreement and Higher‐Order Evidence
Virtue and voluntarism
Evidence, Pragmatics, and Justification
Epistemology of Disagreement
Précis of Knowledge and Practical Interests
| Highly cited | No |
|---|