How Scientific Laws Can Be About Individuals
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9687142 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Robert M Martins (0000-0001-5600-7525, Dalhousie University, corresponding author), Robert M Martin |
| Year | 1986 |
| Volume | 25 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 251-266 |
| Publication date | 1986-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217300048794 |
| OpenAlex | W2155235963 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 5 |
The assumption is often made that there cannot be scientific laws about individuals. I shall try to provide a plausible semantics and epistemology for scientific laws about individuals. This would be interesting, however, only ifone were tempted to believe that mentioning individuals did not disqualify a sentence from scientific lawhood. To begin with, I will try to provide such a temptation
Epistemology · Political science · Scientific evidence · Scientific law · Semantics (computer science) · Temptation · Computer Science · Cybernetics and Technology in Society · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Citations per year | 0.2 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2021 - 2021 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |