Locke as a Fallibilist
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9687561 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Douglas Odegard (University of Guelph, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1996 |
| Volume | 35 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 473-484 |
| Publication date | 1996-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217300008829 |
| OpenAlex | W2002666484 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 6 |
Could John Locke defend his view that the knowledge we acquire in intuition and demonstration is infallible, and should he try to defend it? Peter Schouls thinks the project is unviable, and I think Schouls is right. But I also think Locke should not even bother trying. I shall elaborate on the argument that he could not defend the view, indicate why I think he should abandon infallibility, given his other views, and then investigate what he might usefully say about knowledge and certainty if he were persuaded to abandon it
Argument (complex analysis) · Certainty · Epistemology · Infallibility · Intuition · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Historical Philosophy and Science · Philosophy
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |