Answering the Situationist Challenge
A Defense of Virtue Ethics as Preferable to Other Ethical Theories
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9687587 |
|---|---|
| Authors | MICHELLE CIURRIA (York University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 53 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 651-670 |
| Publication date | 2014-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217314000560 |
| OpenAlex | W2166984122 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 23 |
In a well-known paper, John Doris argues that situationist psychology impugns Aristotelian virtue ethics, which presupposes the existence of stable, situation-independent virtues. Maria Merritt responds that a Humean conception of virtue, which is situation-dependent, is immune to this criticism. However, she does not directly address two of Doris’ more trenchant objections, which he presents in the form of a dilemma. In this paper, I respond to Doris’ dilemma, using recent research in psychology and cognitive science to show that virtue ethics, as a dispositionalist, non-codifiable theory, represents a more empirically adequate moral psychology than the leading alternatives
Criticism · Dilemma · Environmental ethics · Epistemology · Political science · Situationism · Sociology · Virtue · Virtue ethics · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Lack of Character
The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories
Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character
XIV—Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology
Virtue and Reason
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy
The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect
Contextual Trends in Intellectual Development
The Second-Person Standpoint
Modern Moral Philosophy
Moral Responsibility and Tourette Syndrome
Half a minute
| Highly cited | No |
|---|