Descartes’s Indefinitely Extended Universe

Bibliographic Data

ID9687680
AuthorsJasper Reid (0000-0002-4415-6790, King's College London, corresponding author)
Year2019
Volume58
Issue2
Pages341-369
Publication date2019-06-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueDialogue (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0012217318000203
OpenAlexW2802356901
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited18

Descartes believed the extended world did not terminate in a boundary: but why? After elucidating Descartes’s position in §1, suggesting his conception of the indefinite extension of the universe should be understood as actual but syncategorematic, we turn in §2 to his argument: any postulation of an outermost surface for the world will be self-defeating, because merely contemplating such a boundary will lead us to recognise the existence of further extension beyond it. In §3, we identify the fundamental assumption underlying this argument by comparing Descartes’s and Malebranche’s respective conceptions of the ontological status of modes of extension

Argument (complex analysis) · Boundary (topology) · Epistemology · Extension (predicate logic) · Physics · Position (finance) · Quantum mechanics · Theoretical physics · Universe · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Historical Philosophy and Science · History of Science and Medicine · Mathematics · Philosophy

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