Gupta on Sellars’s Theory of Perception
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 9687683 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Byeong D Lee (0000-0001-7080-6702, Sungkyunkwan University, autor correspondente) |
| Ano | 2020 |
| Volume | 59 |
| Fascículo | 4 |
| Páginas | 701-724 |
| Data de publicação | 2020-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Editora | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217319000180 |
| OpenAlex | W2946777046 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referências citadas | 18 |
Recently, Anil Gupta raised several important objections against Wilfrid Sellars’s theory of perception. The purpose of this paper is to defend Sellars’s theory of perception against these objections. I admit that some aspects of his theory are problematic: for example, there are good reasons to reject Sellars’s view that the ultimate referent of a perceptual taking is a sense impression. Nonetheless, I argue that a Sellarsian account of perception is still a viable approach to perception, despite Gupta’s powerful objections
Epistemology · Linguistics · Perception · Referent · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology
| Velocidade de citação | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | Não |