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Bibliographic Data

ID9687736
AuthorsDaniel M Weinstock, Daniel Weinstock (0000-0002-3709-0818, Université de Montréal, corresponding author)
Year1998
Volume37
Issue1
Pages107-116
Publication date1998-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueDialogue (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0012217300047612
OpenAlexW4251292939
LanguageEN
References cited4

One of the most prominent themes of recent political philosophy, at least in the English-speaking world, has been the challenge which the cultural and moral diversity of modern Western societies poses for traditional liberal theories of justice. Given that these theories, in their classical formulations, either ignored the issue of social heterogeneity, or operated on the tacit assumption that the societies to which they would be applied were essentially homogeneous, what changes should a new appreciation of diversity impose upon both the content and the pattern of justification of theories of justice? Philosophers have been far from unanimous in their answers to this basic question. Some, like Will Kymlicka, have argued that recognizably liberal, autonomy-based justificatory arguments should lead us to change our view of liberalism's content, in that it should now incorporate collective rights to the traditional repertoire of individual rights. Others, like Iris Young, have argued that a real recognition of “difference” should lead to the wholesale abandonment of the liberal framework. Still others have argued that it is the manner in which liberalism goes about justifying normative principles that ought to be rethought, given the “fact of pluralism.” The disagreements on moral and political issues which are constitutive of modern societies have led some to argue that we can no longer hope to justify substantive principles deductively on the basis of general moral propositions taken as axiomatic. Authors who follow this line have argued that, in order not to tread on the moral or cultural toes of a diverse citizenry, liberal justification must ultimately reduce to the outcome of certain deliberative procedures. In radically plural societies, justified norms of social interactions are those to which people in conversation with one another would agree

Autonomy · Classical liberalism · Epistemology · Law and economics · Liberalism · Normative · Pluralism (philosophy) · Political science · Politics · Sociology · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics

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  • The Justification of Political Liberalism

    Open Access•Daniel M Weinstock, Daniel Weinstock•Pacific philosophical quarterly•1994

  • Dimensions of radical democracy

    Chantal Mouffe•Dimensions of radical democracy•1992

  • Return of the Citizen

    Will Kymlicka, Wayne Norman•Ethics•1994

Citation velocityhistorical
Highly citedNo

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